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An Incomplete Contract Interpretation 
of the first Greek Bailout in 2010
Yoshihiro TSURANUKI1）
《Abstract》
Applying the concept of incomplete contract, this paper analyzes how the 
European Union had moved to resorting to Article 122(2) Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU in bailing out Greece in May 2010, shifting from its 
long-held position of prohibiting the EU or member states from financially 
assisting any eurozone state in difficulties.
1） I am grateful to Martial Foucault, director of Center for Political Research, and Pascal 
Perrineau, professor of political sciences, both at Paris Institute of Political Studies for 
making this research possible at the institute. I am also grateful to Yutaka Suzuki for his 
introduction of incomplete contract theory. 
Ⅰ　Introduction
This is an incomplete contract interpretation of the first Greek bailout in 
May 2010. It is assumed here that any European Union (the EU) member 
state entering the eurozone, accepting the Stability and Growth Pact (the 
SGP), is signing a contract with the EU. The SGP is a Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU (TFEU). It specifies the conditions that all euro 
member states must abide by. 
However, any treaty or any contract is incomplete due to “the difficulties 
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of describing and verifying contractual performance” (Bolton, 1990: 303). 
The principal, the European Commission (the Commission), has difficulty 
making ex ante an application of the no bail-out clause, Article 125 TFEU, 
contingent on a future state in a verifiable and enforceable way in an initial 
contract.
The Commission similarly has difficulty making ex ante an application of 
Article 122(2) TFEU contingent on a future state in a verifiable and 
enforceable way. Contrary to Article 125 TFEU, Article 122(2) TFEU 
permits the Union or member states to financially assist other eurozone 
states in severe difficulties in some exceptional cases.“[I]t was common 
knowledge that the two parts of the Maastricht settlement were out of 
sync” (Craig, 2013:464). The no bail-out clause was “quid pro quo” for the 
fiscal sovereignty in the EU state. Especially in the eurozone, while being 
subject to fiscal policy guidance and coordination by the Commission as well 
as to fines in case of egregious violation of the SGP deficit limit, each state 
retains fiscal sovereignty. As a natural corollary to this, any financial 
assistance to a member state is prohibited. Nevertheless, Article 122 (2) 
TFEU allows financial assistance by the Union and other member states to a 
member state in severe difficulties in such exceptional cases that exceed the 
member state’s ability to cope (Craig, 2013:460).
The parties to the SGP had made an initial contract that gives the no bail-
out clause the principal weight and gives Article 122(2) TFEU the 
countervailing one. But after a bad state such as the Greek sovereign debt 
crisis broke out, choosing the course of action stipulated ex ante in the 
initial contract, i.e. not bailing out, became ex post inefficient. The 
eurozone was threatened as a whole, unless Greece had been bailed out. 
The European Council and the Greek renegotiated the terms of the initial 
contract to undo this ex post inefficiency and signed the final one, including 
67
bailing out Greece under Article 122(2) TFEU under strict conditions. This 
shift in policy is here analyzed by applying the conceptual framework of 
incomplete contract theory. This is an attempt to interpret real world 
affairs, using the basic concepts of incomplete contract theory. 
Incomplete contract theory has been developed especially in 1980s and 
90s. Tirole defines an incomplete contract in his 1999 article:
[A]t this stage an incomplete contract is rather defined as ad hoc 
restriction on the set of feasible contracts in a given model (Tirole, 
1999:743).
On the other hand, he lists difficulties involved in complete contracting:   
The important feature of complete contracting is that the only 
impediments to perfectly contingent contracting are that the agents 
may have private information at the date of contracting . . . receive 
future information that cannot be directly verified by contract 
enforcement authorities . . . and that agents may take actions that 
cannot be verified (Tirole, 1999:754). 
But he maintains: “There is no limitation on the parties’ ability to 
foresee contingencies, to write contracts, and to enforce them” (Tirole, 
1999:754).
While incomplete contracting has attracted a lot of attention among game 
theorists, it has also been subject to extensive criticism (Tirole, 1999:741-
81).2）
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2） Tirole considers irrelevant one of the major hypotheses of incomplete contract theory, 
indescribability of contingencies, in a game of R & D. He shows that by using “number-
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 Incomplete contract theory incorporates renegotiation in its model. This 
concept of renegotiation seems to match well with what actually happened 
in the first Greek bailout case. Greece accepted all the rules it had to abide 
by as a member of the Eurozone including the no bail-out clause. But it 
later reported fault deficit figures, violating the rules. Its disclosures in the 
aftermath of the Lehman shock led to speculative attacks against Greece in 
financial markets, leading to the sovereign debt crisis. The Council and 
Greece renegotiated the bailout despite the no bail-out clause and reached 
terms to save the eurozone as a whole.
The idea of incomplete contracting is limitedly used here as a frame of 
reference to interpret what has actually happened in the real world, i.e. the 
Greek bailout.3） Incomplete contract theory seems to work better in 
explaining cases of failed contacts in the real world.
based-payoff functions” rather than “action-based-payoff functions”, “the problem of 
indescribability of contingencies” can be overcome (Tirole, 1999: 756-8).
 　In addition, he maintains: “[U]nder some conditions indescribability is irrelevant” and “[T]
he central question of whether ex ante indescribability restricts the set of payoffs that can be 
obtained through contracting boils down to the question of whether an optimal contract under 
describable contingencies would ever prescribe different payoffs in two states of nature in 
which the parties have the same preferences. If the answer is negative, then indescribability 
is irrelevant”(Tirole, 757: 1999). He shows it to be irrelevant under the two assumptions of 
“(a) [s]tate independence of the ratios of marginal utilities of money” and “(b) [u]nidentifiability 
of effort.” He maintains: “It is therefore intuitive that, under these two assumptions (and some 
innocuous ones), indescribability is irrelevant ” (Tirole, 1999: 757-8).Tirole’s critical review of 
incomplete contract theory is very powerful. My objective in this paper is to use major 
hypotheses of incomplete contract theory only to interpret the real world affair, the Greek 
first bailout. Tirole himself admits: “Almost every economists would agree that actual 
contracts are or appear quite incomplete” (Tirole, 1999: 741).
3） Tirole explains why incomplete contracts have attracted a lot of attention: “The recent 
upsurge of incomplete contract models has been partly motivated by a perception that the 
principal-agent model and its variants predict contracts that, on the one hand, are ‘too 
powerful’ in that they underestimate the difficulties involved in real world contracting, and 
on the other hand, lack realism. Yet . . . the indescribability of contingencies, does not per se 
invalidate the classical approach to contracting” (Tirole, 1999:761).
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How is the no bail-out clause an incomplete contract? There is a difficult 
problem involved in making legal principles and economic reality 
compatible with each other. This was the situation political leaders faced in 
the first Greek bailout. Making a compromise on a legal principle to cope 
with an economic urgency is not an easy task. Herdegen points out the 
dilemma of this:
Economic wisdom is what economic science in a given moment 
suggests, as economically sound. Freezing institutional rules and 
substantive principles on this basis implies an obvious risk which is 
inherent in all dictates of economic wisdom: subsequent falsification by 
new empirical messages or any scenarios which have not been 
anticipated (Herdegen, 1998:9).
By depriving a member state of any hope that the Union or other 
member states will come to its rescue, the no bail-out clause leaves every 
member state on its own and puts it under strict financial discipline. It aims 
at deterring any member state from taking prodigal fiscal policy and 
consequently from financially free-riding on the Union or other member 
states. 
This is an approach to default from purely a legal point of view. Spill-over 
effects from default, however, would force the Union and other member 
states to bail out a member state in sovereign debt crisis. Verde points out: 
[H]owever, according to many economists the no bail-out clause is 
inevitably meaningless. Indeed, when a Member State is experiencing 
a speculative attack and impaired access to private credit, it is difficult 
to conceive how the Union – that is the ECB or other Member States – 
An Incomplete Contract Interpretation of the first Greek Bailout in 2010
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could refuse it. (Verde, 2011:155).
Being financially interlinked all together, they were unable to leave a 
member state to face default on its own. Dissolving themselves from legal 
responsibility alone would not work and would become ex post inefficient.
Heipertz and Verdun point out: “The Maastricht Treaty is hence from 
the very outset an incomplete contract as far as rules on EMU are 
concerned” (Heipertz and Verdun, 2012:80). Craig offers a concrete 
explanation for this view: “[T]he ESM [the European Stability Mechanism] 
was addressing a problem that was not envisaged by the treaty framers” 
(Craig, 2012:473). Incomplete contract theory describes this point as 
indescribability of contingencies or “[u]nforseen contingencies” in Tirole’s 
terms (Tirole, 1999: 743). Due to the difficulty in foreseeing contingencies, 
incomplete contract theorists maintain that contracts become incomplete.4）
As is pointed out above, a typical example of unforeseen contingencies 
was the establishment of the ESM. It is the European version of the IMF 
set up after the Greek crisis to fill the gap left open by the Maastricht 
Treaty, which lacked a bail-out mechanism.
Craig argues that to make necessary room for the ESM to be compatible 
with Article 125 TFEU, the latter “should be narrowly construed in this 
instance.” He pointed out that Article 125 TFEU “was designed with 
individual cases in mind, preventing bailouts of particular states when 
national fiscal policy or irresponsibility led to problems confined to that 
state” and that “Article 125, and the more general schema in Articles 122 
4） Tirole criticizes this assumption itself: “At the very least they know how payoffs relate to the 
initial contract and investments . . . dynamic programming implies a minimum amount of 
foreseeability, namely that of payoffs, even if we make the assumption that parties do not 
know how and under what circumstances these payoffs will be achieved”(Tirole, 1999:744).
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to 126, was not on this view structured so as to cope with the circumstance 
when the very future of the euro was at stake” (Craig, 2013:473). Thus, 
Article 125 TFEU has not been formulated to cover any systemic risk. This 
is the reason for considering the no bail-out clause to be an incomplete 
contract.
Ⅱ　Theoretical review
1　Unforeseen contingencies and transaction cost:
Hart and Moore point out how contracts become incomplete due to the 
transaction cost in writing “a complete contingent contract”: 
The difficult task facing the drafters of a contract is to anticipate and 
deal appropriately with the many contingencies . . .  Since it may be 
prohibitively costly to specify . . .  the parties are in practice likely to 
end up writing a highly incomplete contract (Hart and Moore, 
1988:755).
Tirole, however, argues that “indescribability of contingencies” is not 
necessarily the major factor making contracts incomplete: “the 
indescribability of contingencies does not restrict the set of payoff 
outcomes that can be achieved through contract between parties” (Tirole, 
1999:744).5）
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5）Tirole extensively reviews core hypotheses of incomplete contracting and compare them as 
the benchmark with these of complete contracting and argues that incomplete contract 
theorists have thrown away complete contracting without exhausting the feasibility of 
complete contracting solution. He points out in a R&D game in which an agent makes 
unobserved efforts to produce innovation at stage 1 and she and a principal see at stage 2 
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In Hart’s and Moore’s terms, any member state in the eurozone is 
“locked-in to each other” once it accepts the terms of the monetary union, 
which all members have to make “relation-specific investments” to meet. 
Whether they have abided by these terms must be governed by 
“contractual provision” (Hart and Moore, 1988: 755). But the contractual 
provision, the SGP, is likely to be incomplete for the reasons raised by Hart 
and Moore above.
In addition, the European Court of Justice (the ECJ) has a tendency to 
avoid intervening in critical political matters, helping the no bail-out clause 
to be an incomplete contract. Though media repeatedly used the word 
bailout in reporting, the ECJ avoided using “the language of bailout” in 
order not to cause any further difficulty and to save the ESM. Craig 
observes:
The interesting issue . . . was precisely how the ECJ would save the 
ESM from its alleged incompatibility with Article 125 TFEU (Craig, 
2013:473).   
２　Ex post inefficiency and renegotiation
It can be possible to deal with ex post inefficiency arising from unforeseen 
contingencies through ex post renegotiation. Since the state is ex post 
whether innovation has taken place or not: “A key point, though, is that with rational actors 
the contingencies are not unforeseen even though they cannot be described ex ante. One way 
of thinking about the problem is the parties envision the existence of n 1possible techniques 
available at date 2, which, for want of a better description, they ex ante label 1 through n. 
The parties know that in case of ‘innovation’ one of the techniques will have value V for the 
principal and the other techniques no value, say. In the absence of innovation, none of the 
available techniques has any value to the principal” (Tirole, 1999: 745-6).Thus, he questions 
the relevance of indescribability of contingencies itself, while Hart and Moore consider it to 
be “the major ‘transaction cost’” for making contracts incomplete(Hart and Moore, 
1988:757).　
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already realized, what is necessary is to make a contract contingent on this 
realized state. Grossman and Hart point out that writing a contract under 
symmetric information is costless and leads to efficient allocation. They also 
point out: “The distribution of ex post surplus, however, will be sensitive to 
ownership right” because “each ownership structure will lead to (different) 
distortion in ex ante investment” (Grossman and Hart, 1988:696-7).
Once the state is realized, it enables the contracting parties to rewrite 
the contract by making it contingent on this realized state. Hart and Moore 
explain:
Suppose that the states of the world ωare highly complex . . .
it may be possible for the parties to revise and/or renegotiate the 
contract once ω is realized (Hart and Moore, 1988:756).
Bolton summarizes how contracting parties come to renegotiate the 
terms of an initial contract:
[I]n order to achieve ex-ante efficiency one generally needs to specify 
ex-post outcomes that are Pareto-efficiency. This naturally creates the 
possibility of ex-post renegotiation, for once the contracting parties 
reach the point where an inefficient outcome is suggested by the 
contract (Bolton, 1990:304).
Aghion and Bolton similarly say:
Note that since ex ante contracts are incomplete there may be room 
for Pareto-improving renegotiation once the parties learn the 
realization of θ[a state of nature] . . . they may wish to renegotiate 
An Incomplete Contract Interpretation of the first Greek Bailout in 2010
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the initial contract (Aghion and Bolton, 1992:478-9).
In the eurozone, the no bail-out clause had been likely ex ante efficient, 
deterring any member state from taking prodigal fiscal policy. However, 
once Greece had fallen into sovereign debt crisis, holding on to the no bail-
out clause became ex post inefficient. The eurozone states had to 
renegotiate and seek a way to prevent the Greek default from threatening 
the eurozone as a whole.
The drafters of the SGP, in the above sense, had not foreseen the Greek 
sovereign debt crisis and failed to “specify ex-post outcome that is Pareto-
efficiency” in Bolton’s terms.6）
３　Two incentives: “incentive compatib[ility]” and “renegotiation-
proof”
Efficient contracts which involve renegotiation must meet two types of 
incentive. Contracts must be not only “‘incentive compatible’” but also 
“‘renegotiation-proof.’” As to the latter, Bolton points out :“ When parties 
can commit not to renegotiate they have a choice of when to allow the 
renegotiation and when not” (Bolton, 1990: 303). 
First, to meet incentive compatibility, a principal needs to provide an 
agent with sufficient incentive for the latter’s effort so that the latter finds a 
contract incentive compatible for him. 
Second, incentive for “re-negotiation-proof” is that a principal refuses a 
renegotiation offer from an agent when the realized state is good and that 
6）Tirole shows in the R&D game that “specify[ing] ex post outcome” is possible despite the 
indescribability of contingencies: “Despite the indescribability of contingencies, the principal 
is able to obtain the same payoff outcome as when the innovation is ex ante describable” 
(Tirole, 1999:746). 
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the principal accepts a renegotiation offer from the agent when the realized 
state is bad and needs to provide incentive for the agent to make necessary 
investment to undo ex post inefficiency.
To induce the agent to make necessary investment, the principal has to 
make considerable monetary concession to the agent. For the agent, it is 
rational to make the needed investment to undo ex post inefficiency in 
exchange for the concession it gets. For the principal, undoing ex post 
inefficiency is rational even at the price of the concession it has to make in 
renegotiation. 
4　Renegotiation-proof
Renegotiation, however, leads to yet another problem. Once the 
contracting parties permit renegotiation, they cannot commit “not to 
renegotiate” and “will have to abandon these contracts designed to be 
executed without renegotiation” (Bolton, 1990:304). Thus, “ex-post 
renegotiation hurts ex-ante efficiency” (Bolton, 1990:309). To deal with this 
problem of being unable to “commit not to renegotiate” (Bolton, 1990:304), 
now we have to put a mechanism into a contract which makes the contract 
to be renegotiation-proof. 
We can write a renegotiation-proof contract once a state is realized. A 
state having already been realized, we now know what the realized state is. 
As explained earlier, we can write a contract contingent on the realized 
state. We can also make a contract to be renegotiation-proof because “the 
outcome of this renegotiation is perfectly predictable” (Bolton, 1990:303). 
However, making the contract renegotiation-proof is costly. In an 
entrepreneur-investor game, the entrepreneur has a preference of 
continuation over liquidation of a project funded by the investor. On the 
other hand, the investor wants the entrepreneur to liquidate a project that 
An Incomplete Contract Interpretation of the first Greek Bailout in 2010
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is in a bad state. In this conflict of interest, making concession in the good 
state is “excessive.” The investor thus wants costly renegotiation only in 
the bad state (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005:528-9). 
By providing the entrepreneur with sufficient incentive, the investor can 
induce him to liquidate a project in a bad state. However, in a good state, 
the investor refuses any renegotiation offer from the entrepreneur. Since 
any renegotiation must be held only after both sides agree to renegotiate. 
Neither side can unilaterally demand renegotiation. And when both sides 
hold renegotiation on the basis of mutual agreement, it is Pareto 
improving.
5　Contingent allocation of control rights
Renegotiation in the preceding section is, however, a case of 
renegotiation via the Nash bargaining solution [the NBS] in which a 
principal and an agent share marginal surplus in the ratio of their bargaining 
powers. Here, marginal surplus means all additional surpluses added to 
their payoffs at the status quo point, the point where there is no 
agreement, by reaching an agreement in the NBS.
There is another renegotiation that is via a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer 
game. In the “take-it-or-leave-it” offer game, the principal takes all 
marginal surpluses (Binmore, 1998:21). The first Greek bailout was a case 
in which Greece had to accept all the demands and a harsh austerity 
program for debt repayment and economic reforms that had been made to 
them by the EU. This is because control rights are allocated in a state 
contingent way. Control rights take many forms. For example, “they can 
be contingent (“debtholders receive control if covenant X is violated” 
(Tirole, 2006:387).
As long as Greece remains solvent, it can maintain fiscal sovereignty. 
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Once it falls in default status and needs bailout, it has to yield fiscal 
sovereignty or control rights over its fiscal and economic policy to bailing-
out institutions or the creditors. 
Control rights thus shift to the bailing-out institutions in a state 
contingent way (Tirole, 2006:393-4; Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005:531-
4).7）Bolton and Dewatripont, and Aghion and Bolton state on this point in a 
similar manner (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005:530) and (Aghion and 
Bolton, 1992:490).
Aghion and Bolton emphasize that contingent allocation of control is a 
special feature “associated with debt financing”:
By giving control to the investor when s = 0, the debt contract can 
limit the extent of rent extraction through expost renegotiation. At the 
same time, when s = 1, the investor cannot prevent the entrepreneur 
from obtaining his private benefits (Aghion and Bolton, 1992:486). 
Here, s = 1 means that a publicly verifiable signal of the realized state in 
period 1 is good and s = 0 means that a publicly verifiable signal of the 
realized state in period 1 is bad (Aghion and Bolton, 1992:477-85, especially 
477).
Contingent allocation of control also raises incentive for an agent to work 
hard in an attempt not to lose control. Tirole points out:“[T]he indirect 
effect [of the allocation of the control] refers to the motivational impact of 
the threat of losing control in case of bad performance”(Tirole, 2006:394).
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7） Tirole considers the allocation of control rights to be “the first theme” of incomplete contract 
theory: “The first theme . . . is the allocation of property rights determines the bargaining 
powers in the ex post determination of the terms of trade and that the holders of property rights 
are somewhat protected against the expropriation of their specific investment. Property 
rights thereby boost the holders’ incentive to invest”(Tirole, 1999:749).
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6　Hold-up problem
Contingent control right allocation leads to a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer 
game in debt financing. But the “take-it-or-leave-it” offer game involves an 
incentive problem. In this game, different from the NBS, the principal 
takes all marginal surpluses. It is all allocated to paying back debt to the 
principal, leaving no surplus for the agent. This leaves the agent lacking in 
any incentive for implementing the final contract, which includes harsh 
restructuring of its economy such as cutting back government spendings, 
raising taxes, privatizations, deregulation, and liberalization of the 
economy. All of these actions are quite unpopular and face strong 
opposition from the public. Any government would face extreme difficulty 
in carrying out any of these actions. Without sufficient incentive being 
provided for the agent to carry out reforms, the government will hold back 
on any reforms. Then, the final contract would be left to fail. A 
considerable reason for the failures of successive Greek bailouts since the 
initial bailout in 2010 has been this lack of proper incentive (Suzuki and 
Tsuranuki, 2015:1-12).
Tirole summarizes incomplete contract theory on the above point: “A 
second common theme is that the exercise of property rights is limited by the 
indispensability of the other party in the ex post process (Tirole, 1999:749). 
Therefore, “[i]n the R & D game, the buyer’s indispensability limits the 
agent’s share to 50%” (Tirole, 1999:749). In incomplete contract theory, in 
ex post renegotiation, if renegotiation is held via the NBS, marginal 
surpluses are divided between the agent and the principal based on their 
relative bargaining powers. If their bargaining powers are equal, the 
marginal surpluses are divided in half, with each party receiving 50 per 
cent. 
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7　The NBS and commitment problem
In renegotiation, switching from the “take-it-or-leave-it” offer game to 
the NBS can provide an agent with the necessary incentive to implement 
the reforms. But this in turn creates a commitment problem. Once any 
concession is made to a defaulting member state, other member states take 
their example into consideration and capitalize on it. This leads to a 
weakening in commitment to fiscal discipline. Further loosening of fiscal 
discipline may follow (Suzuki and Tsuranuki, 2015:11).
Based on the theoretical review above, in the following section, I 
conceptually apply incomplete contract theory to an analysis of the first 
Greek bailout in 2010.
Ⅳ　Timeline of the first Greek bailout
Timeline of the first Greek bailout process in the eurozone:
signing flexibilisation realized renegotiation agent’s investment,
an initial of the initial state over the terms of payoff realization
contract contract  the initial contract and its division
----------------------------------------------------------------→
t1  t1.5  t2 t3 t4
In the timeline above, t1.5 is added to the standard format of timeline of 
incomplete contract, considering the unique case in the eurozone fiscal 
governance.
An Incomplete Contract Interpretation of the first Greek Bailout in 2010
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Ⅴ t1: Signing the initial contract
The principal is the Commission, representing the EU. The agent is 
Greece. They sign an initial contract at t1. The contract is to comply with 
the SGP rules. That means that Greece cannot exceed the budget deficit 
limit of 3 per cent of GDP and the debt limit of 60 per cent of GDP and must 
bring the budget deficit close to balance or change it to a surplus in the 
mid-term convergence program.
Any eurozone state would be placed in the excessive deficit procedures 
(the EDP) if it exceeds the 3 per cent budget deficit limit and fails to 
correct it after being recommended to do so within the specified time limit 
from the Commission. If the member state still fails to correct its budget 
deficit, it will be assessed a fine in the amount of 0.2per cent8） of GDP in 
the maximum by the adoption of the Commission’s recommendation at the 
Council by the qualified majority voting (the QMV).
Together with the no bail-out clause, these collective guidance and 
preventive measures were expected to prevent any member state from 
exceeding the 3 per cent deficit limit. It goes without saying that all 
member states were expected to not fall into default. (In this sense, the no 
bail-out seems to have been close to the concept of social contract on which 
basis all eurozone states coordinate their fiscal policies (see social 
contracts, Binmore, 1998:4-11)).
Verdun, for example, points out:
8） The European Commission said in connection with Spain’s and Portugal’s violation of the EU 
fiscal rules on July 6, 2016: “. . . there is a strong chance the EU will set any fines at a 
nominal or even zero level.” This suggests that fines to be imposed would actually start at 
zero or a nominal level. Jim Brunsden and Tobias Buck, “Spain and Portugal head for EU 
clash,” the FT, 6 July 2016, p. 3.
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The creators of the euro had put their confidence in a so-called ‘no bail 
out clause’ and rules that would ensure that budgetary deficits and 
public debt of member states would not exceed ceilings (Verdun, 
2012:117).
Saden similarly emphasizes the EU leaders’ reliance on the no bail-out 
clause:
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty . . . specifically ruled out mutual 
guarantees for member governments’ debts (‘bail-out’) (Saden, 2012: 
121). 
Preventing default by any eurozone state might be close to what Tirole 
calls a status quo project:
The organization can implement a status quo project 0 that yields 
known profit B0> 0 together with a private benefit b0> 0 to the agent. 
This status quo may be interpreted either as “doing nothing” . . . or as 
“pursuing current policy” or “renewing last years’ budget” (Tirole, 
1999:766-7). 
So long as eurozone states kept the status quo project 0 and did not deviate 
too egregiously from the budget deficit limit of 3 per cent of DP, Greece 
would not have faced a sovereign debt crisis. If and only when their 
egregious deviation occurred, the Commission and the agent proceeded to t 
2, the state realized.
What kind of give-and-take game exists between the principal, the 
Commission, and an agent, each member state (e.g. Greece), corresponding 
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to an investor and an entrepreneur relationship in which the former 
provides funding for a project and the latter provides returns to the 
principal and other interested parties? The eurozone membership enables 
Greece to keep yield on its sovereign bords as low as yield on German 
Bunds. In return for receiving the same credit ratings in sovereign bonds 
markets, Greece is expected to maintain fiscal discipline. 
If spread between yield on the German Bunds and yield on Greek 
sovereign bonds remains marginal or small, there is no problem. But once 
Greece loosens its fiscal discipline, the spread widens. Then, it calls in 
speculative attacks on Greek bonds based on expectation that Greece might 
be forced out of the eurozone. Speculative attacks on other weaker 
economies in the eurozone might follow, threatening the eurozone as a 
whole.
Ⅵ　t1.5: “Flexibilisation” of the SGP
After the introduction of the euro in 1999, in November 2003, Germany 
and France, exceeding the budget deficit limit and being placed under the 
EDP, faced the recommendation of fine against each by the Commission at 
the Council. However, the recommendations against them looked likely not 
to gather a qualified majority voting at the Council. They were suspended. 
This is said to have led to “severe weakening by Regulations” (Blanke, 
2012: 399).
Following this, in 2005, the SGP regulations were revised. Under the 
revised regulations, in setting the medium-term budgetary objective, 
consideration was said to be given to the diversity in economic and 
budgetary positions “as well as of risk to the sustainability of public 
finance” of individual member states (Blank, 2012: 399).
83
When the global financial crisis hit the eurozone, this loosening of the 
SGP rules led to a dramatic rise in deficit in the eurozone, from close to 
zero in 2007 to an estimated 7 per cent of GDP in 2008 (Blank, 2012:400).  
Ⅶ　t2: Realized state
In 2009, the newly elected Greek government disclosed false reporting of 
its budget deficit, which actually amounted to nearly13 per cent of GDP. 
Greece soon came under speculative attacks in financial markets, which 
judged its high deficit and high debts to be unsustainable (Verde, 2011:144-
5). Greece thus faced sovereign default, being unable to raise money in 
bond markets. This was the realized state despite the SGP rules including 
the no bail-out clause.
Ⅷ　t3: Renegotiation and signing the final contract
How did the European Council respond to the Greek financial crisis? In 
this process, the social contract (Binmore, 1998; 4-9) in the eurozone 
shifted from non-bailing out to bailing out.
1　Built-in parameter for policy shift
Two conflicting clauses are incorporated in the SGP. One is Article 125 
TFEU. The other is Article 122(2) TFEU. Between the two conflicting 
clauses, a certain parameter is built in. It is the systemic risk parameter. 
There are certain indicators of systemic risk. For example, the spread 
between German Bunds and Greek sovereign bonds is one of such indexes.
The spread refers to the difference in yields each country has to pay on 
its bonds. Greece has to pay the spread to investors so that it can attract 
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them into investing in riskier Greek bonds rather than safer German 
Bunds. Unless the spread is high enough, they switch to German Bunds for 
safer investments. However, once the spread rises to a certain critical 
level, markets judge that Greece is no longer able to pay back its debts. 
Then, investors sell off Greek bonds, making Greece no longer able to raise 
needed money in financial markets. Greece thus faced default in early 
2010.
Credit default swap (CDS) is also another indicator. It is widely said that 
if CDS against certain sovereign bond defaults reaches certain points, the 
state issuing the bonds faces default risk.
As Verde points out, “[f]oreign investors soon” reached “a consensus on 
what to do: get rid of” Greek from bond markets (Verde, 2011:144-5).The 
Greek crisis had the potential to spread into other weak states such as 
Portugal, Spain and Italy, posing systemic risk.
This was the situation that the EU leaders faced. In response to shift in 
parameter from merely deterring any member state from prodigal fiscal 
policy to staving off the more ominous risk, the systemic risk, the EU 
leaders changed their position. Verde summarizes this shift:
First, the treaty explicitly ruled out any hypothesis of bailout . . . The 
German stance on Greece bailout eventually changed quite radically 
after pressure from the Obama administration and this allowed EU-
ECB-IMF to approve the rescue plan which had the merit of lessening 
the gravity of the crisis (Verde, 2011:146).
2　Reinterpretation of Article 125 TFEU
Then, how had they made this shift compatible with the no bail-out 
clause or Article 125TFEU? Louis points out one exception being attached 
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to Article 125 TFEU (Louis, 2011: 977). It is the case “[w]here a Member 
State is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties 
caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control” 
(cited in Louis, 2010:981). 
Louis argues that Article 122 (2) TFEU, cited above, constitutes a 
“‘counterweight’ to the no bailout-clause” of Article 125 (1) TFEU and 
“must be interpreted” in that way (Louis, 2010:983).
Herdegen similarly argued well before the Greek crisis:
[T]he no bail-out provision of the EC Treaty cannot sweep away the 
fact that the euro area will constitute a solidarity compact, the 
members of which are under de fact obligation to rescue defaulting 
partners” (Herdegen, 1998:22). 
This [the no bail-out clause], however, does not rule out the possibility 
that the Community and national authorities will yield to pressure to 
rescue a Member State unable to serve its government debts 
(Herdegen, 1998:26).
Tuori further argues that the no bail-out clause should be subject to such 
necessity as preventing the euro system from collapsing as a whole:
. . . the more general objective of the regulative whole Art 125 (1) is 
part of it. And this ‘second-order’ telos of the no-bailout-clause 
undoubtedly includes the financial stability of the euro area as a whole 
(cited in Craig, 2013:474).
Craig too similarly argues in relation with the European Financial Stabili 
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zation Mechanism (EFSM):
While some commentators questioned whole Article 122 (2) TFEU 
provided a valid base for the EFSM, it can be interpreted so as to 
legitimate the assistance (Craig, 2013:466).
Verde pushes the above point further that neither the ECB nor other 
member states can stand idle without “rescuing” any member state “under 
attack and impaired access to private credit.” As the reason for it, he 
points out that through heavy exposure of financial institutions of other 
member states to securities issued by the member state in severe financial 
difficulties, the “generalized financial crash” would ensue and “could result 
in the end of the Monetary Union”(Verde, 2011:155).   
3　Clearing Article 126 TFEU
However, the EU financial assistance must also clear Article 126 TFEU 
on excessive deficits. With respect to excessive deficit problems, Article 
126 TFEU provides “a special procedure to be applied” (Louis, 2010:984). 
If any issue has to be covered by Article 122 (2), it should be the case to be 
covered by other than Article 126 TFEU.
To allow such a measure, Article 122 (2) TFEU stipulates that the case 
must be with “severe difficulties” and must be a situation “seriously 
threatened with severe difficulties.” Therefore, “[t]he occurrence has to be 
exceptional and not manageable under other Treaty provisions” (Louis, 
2010:984). Furthermore, an excessive deficit problem “per se” does not 
qualify any EU’s or member states’ financial assistance “because a debt 
problem derives from the cumulative effect of the decisions of the State 
concerned” (cited from Louis, 2010:984, footnote no. 48). For justification, 
87
as such “severe difficulties” stipulated in Article 122 (2) TFEU, the Council 
had to bring contagious risk, i.e. spillover of the Greek crisis to other 
eurozone member states such as Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy (Louis, 
2010:984).
4　Moving to a new equilibrium
Article 125 TFEU prohibits financial assistance to any member state. 
However, if the situation develops into “an asymmetric shock or a shock 
common to a number of Member States,” in such a case regardless of its 
origin, “a derogation to Article 125” could be justifiable (Louis, 2010: 984). 
Louis pointed out: “It became clear for Greece’s partners that it could not 
be left on its own, for the sake of the stability of the euro area, and that 
letting a euro area member default as a ‘solution’ was not an acceptable 
one” (Louis, 2010:985).
Since this was the measure to cope with an exceptional risk, the measure 
should be “temporary.” It must end when the situation is stabilized (Louis, 
2010:985).
5　Signing the final contract
Renegotiation was held between the EU and Greece over the terms of 
the initial contract. In May 2010, the Council decided to bail out Greece. 
Since Greece went bankrupt financially, it had to yield control rights over 
its finances as the entrepreneur-investor game suggests. The terms on 
bailing out were thus set via a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer game.
In exchange for being bailed out, Greece promised to implement 
economic reforms including cutting expenditures drastically, labor reforms, 
privatization and other measures.
Since the state was already realized, the contract such as reimbursement 
An Incomplete Contract Interpretation of the first Greek Bailout in 2010
88
of bailout money to Greece could be made contingent on Greece’s 
implementation of the promised reforms. Under the terms, reimbursements 
were made quid pro quo for Greece’s implementation of the promised 
reforms. Although there has been considerable moral hazard on the Greek 
side and although Greece’s implementation of reforms has been half-hearted, 
the reforms seem to have been considerably carried out.
Ⅸ　Payoff realization and its division
What was payoff realization? For the EU, the spillover to other weaker 
economies or the systemic risk was prevented. For Greece, it was being 
able to avoid disastrous default.
9）Louis summarizes the rescue package:
“The acceleration . . . of the crisis to other euro area Member States . . . , prompted an 
extraordinary meeting of the Ecofin Council, on 9/10 May. As a follow-up to an improvised 
Summit of the euro area Member States on 7/8 May, the Ecofin Council was to provide for a 
European stabilization mechanism including:
─ a ‘European financial stabilization mechanism’, created . . . based on Article 122 (2) 
TFEU . . . which could mobilize up to 60 billion euros . . . subject to strong conditionality . . .
─ an intergovernmental agreement . . . called the ‘European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF). . . provide loans . . . up to 440 billion euro, the IMF participating in financial 
arrangements by providing . . . 250 billion euro, bringing the total to 750 billion euro.” 
(Louis, 2010: 973-974). 
89An Incomplete Contract Interpretation of the first Greek Bailout in 2010
References
Aghion, Phillipe and Patrick Bolton (1992), “An Incomplete Contracts Approach 
to Financial Contracting,” Review of Economic Studies, 99, 473-494.
Binmore, Ken (1998), Game Theory and the Social Contract II. Just Playing, the 
MIT Press, Cambridge.
Blanke, Hermann-Jose (2012), “The Economic Constitution of the European 
Union” in Herman-Josef Blanke and Stelio Mangiameli eds., The European 
Union after Lisbon, Springer Berlin.
Bolton, Patrick (1990), “Renegotiation and the Dynamics of Contract Design,” 
European Economic Review, 34, pp. 303-310.
Bolton, Patrick and Mathias Dewatripont (2005), Contract Theory, MIT Press, 
Cambridge.
Craig, Paul (2013), the Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford.
Grossman, Sanford J and Oliver D. Hart (1988), “The Costs and Benefits of 
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,” Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4, 691-719.
Hart, Oliver and John Moore ( July, 1988), “Incomplete Contracts and 
Renegotiation,” Econometrica, Vol.56, No.4, pp. 755-785.
Heipertz, Martin and Amy Verdun (2012), the Politics of the Stability and Growth 
Pact, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Herdegen, Mathias J. (1998), “Price Stability and Budgetary Restrictions in the 
Economic and Monetary Union: The Law as Guardian of Economic 
Wisdom,” The Common Market Law Review, Vol.35, 9-32.
Louis, Jean-Victor (2010), “Guest Editorial: The no-bailout clause and rescue 
package,” The Common Market Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 4, (August 2010), 
pp. 971-986.
Saden, Tal (2012), “The end of the Euro Mark I: a skeptical view of EMU,” in 
Hubert Zimmemann and Andreas Dureds: Key Controversies in European 
Integration, palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire.
Suzuki, Yutaka and Yoshihiro Tsuranuki (May, 2015), “An incomplete contract 
approach to Eurozone fiscal governance,” mimeograph, Faculty of 
Economics, Hosei University, pp. 1-13.
Tirole, Jean ( July, 1999), “Incomplete Contract: Where Do We Stand?” 
Econometrica, Vol. 67, No. 4, pp. 741-781.
90
Tirole, Jean (2006), Corporate Finance, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Verde,Antimo (2011), “The Greek Debt Crisis: Causes, Policy Responses and 
Consequences,” in Pompeo Della Posta and Leila Simona Talani eds., 
Europe and the Financial Crisis, palgrave MacMillan, New York, pp. 143-
164.
Verdun, Amy(2012), “The euro has a future,” in Hubert Zimmermann and 
Andreas Du eds., Key Controversies in European Integration, palgrave, 
MacMillan, Hampshire.
